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Abstract: This paper reviews the foundations of the unilateral standard accident model under 
Knightian uncertainty. It extends the Teitelbaum (2007)’s seminal article (who introduces 
radical uncertainty) by expanding it from producers to victims and from the probability 
distribution of accidents to the scale of damage. Mainly, it also considers a regulator who 
aggregates the agents’ preferences (Neghisi (1960) type). Under the condition that the 
troublemakers’ resources are sufficient to cover the damage, the article shows that 
uncertainty does not preclude, first, the determination of a socially optimal level of care, and 
second, whatever the civil liability regime (strict liability or negligence) it shows that they 
determine the same level of socially first-best care. The solution is inefficient only when the 
polluter’s wealth is insufficient to repair the victim’s losses. 
 
JEL codes: D62, K13, K23, K32, Q52, Q58. 
 
Keywords: unilateral accident, tort law, safety, large risks, ambiguity, pessimism and 
optimism, strict liability, negligence, ultra-hazardous activities.  
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Introduction 
 
Initiated by Ronald Coase (1960) and developed by Calabresi (1970), Brown (1973) and 
especially Shavell (1980), (1982), (1987b), the standard unilateral accident model constitutes 
the backbone of the economic analysis of tort law.  Initially, created by lawyers and judges, 
tort law legally forces the wrongdoers to compensate their victims’ losses. Beyond 
compensation, the economists showed that the tort law challenge is to understand how the 
prospect of paying heavy repairs to victims can motivate potential tortfeasors to provide the 
highest prevention level against risk. Hence, the model is simple: a potential wrongdoer 
performs activities likely to cause harm to other agents (victims). The prospect of losses due 
to compensation must encourage him (her) to take preventive measures to enhance his 
business from hazards.  
Basically, the present paper reviews the foundations of the unilateral accident model 
under Knightian uncertainty or, still, “ambiguity”. Indeed, in recent years, various 
contributions have extended the unilateral model of accident to radical uncertainty1. The 
Teitelbaum (2007)’s pioneering representation formalizes Knightian uncertainty applied to 
tort law. He substitutes to the classical Savage Expectation Utility, the new developments of 
ambiguity theory. In this model, uncertainty leads to ambiguous choices as in the Ellsberg’s 
paradox .To formalize ambiguity, Teitelbaum (2007) assumes that the polluters’ utility 
function takes the form of a so-called “neo-additive capacity” that allocates specific weights 
to extreme earnings (maximum and minimum payoff), and the expected gain (expectation). 
He shows that both a strict liability and a fault-based regime do not achieve a socially optimal 
prevention level. However, negligence seems more efficient than strict liability. Other 
contributions in this vein confirm the relationship between uncertainty and care level 
inefficiency. For instance, Franzoni (2012) considers the case of ambiguous risk where 
ambiguity is graded because of the existence of alternative distributions on the accidents 
likelihood. He analyses unilateral and bilateral accident models. He shows that, under strict 
liability, damage increases with rising ambiguity. In contrast, under negligence, safety 
standards increase but only when the injurer’s perceived ambiguity reduces. Furthermore, 
when the polluter feels both a lower degree of risk and ambiguity aversion than the victim and 
a lower estimate of the damage likelihood, then, strict liability is more efficient than 
negligence.  
                                                          
1 “Unilateral" means that the victims cannot buffer themselves from the accidents risk. Consequently, this 
relieves them from any liability, unlike the bilateral accident model. 
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In a somewhat different model, Langlais (2012) also shows that Knight’s uncertainty 
leads to socially inefficient level of care. He considers a global non-insurable risk where the 
polluters invest in reducing risk technologies. Compared to victims, the polluter feels a fewer 
degree of aversion to risk and ambiguity. Then, his estimate of the prejudice likelihood 
corresponds also to a lower ambiguity degree. Langlais’ model is based on supposed 
pessimistic and risk-averse agents. Agents are maximizers Rank Dependent Expected Utility. 
He shows that the required security level is higher than in a neutral to risk economy and that 
no liability regime is significantly efficient. 
Similarly to the above approaches, our paper also introduces radical uncertainty in the 
unilateral accident model. However, it clearly differs from them because it shows, first, that 
uncertainty does not prevent the formation of a socially optimal care level and, second, that 
strict liability and negligence are equivalent when the polluter’s wealth covers damage. 
Hence, inefficiencies appear when the damage costs are higher than the tortfeasor’s wealth. 
This issue comes from the nature of the regulator’s utility function. The latter is benevolent, 
omniscient but of Negishi (1960)’s type. This means that the social utility function aggregates 
the agents’ preference conversely to the usual models that consider a neutral to risk regulator.  
Furthermore, technically, compared to Teitelbaum (2007) and other mentioned works, 
our model extends the field of uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty integrates the accident 
probabilities (Teitelbaum (2007)), but also the question of the scale of damage which , here, is 
comprised in an interval and cannot be represented by only a mathematic expectation as in the 
usual case. Furthermore, ambiguous feelings concerns both the polluters (as in Teitelbaum 
(2007), Langlais (2012), Franzoni (2012)), and the victims. 
However, this model does not examine in depth the issue of equivalence of a strict 
liability regime versus negligence by considering the distortions of appreciation between 
regulator and court, for example, or errors made by the judges. Pursuing such a discussion on 
this topic would led us too far (see Sommer (1983), Shavell (1980 b), Polinsky (1980), etc.).  
1. Extension of the uncertainty area 
In the present model, the uncertainty area is twofold. First, as in Teitelbaum (2007)’s 
article, radical uncertainty applies to beliefs associated with the probability distribution of 
accidents (see also Franzoni (2012) and Langlais (2012)). Such uncertainty implies that this 
probability distribution is common knowledge between the regulator and the injurers. 
However, the latter may cast doubts regarding the effective probability of accident. These 
doubts depend of the injurer’s level of optimism and the confidence in the regulator’s 
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assessment. This discrepancy raises the question of how assessing accident risk in hazardous 
industries. For example, when the industrial operator controls the risky technology, the 
question of how transferring this knowledge to the regulator is at stake. Teitelbaum’s 
uncertainty reveals this asymmetry: the government specialized offices define a specific 
accident probability considering the given hazardous activity. However, the operators or 
producers that manage it may assess differently its risk. In our model, this uncertainty field 
extends to potential victims. Generally, in the unilateral accident models, the victims do not 
act directly on the level of protection: they “disappear” from the decision process. Here, 
excluding the victims’ preferences is no longer possible because the regulator aggregates the 
individuals’ utility to define the social utility function. Hence, their beliefs influence the first-
best care level. 
The second uncertainty source comes from the scale of damage. Indeed, generally, 
experience lacks to assess the effective extent of technological collapses. Disaster data is 
often insufficient because each case is specific. For example, it is difficult to assess the 
negative consequences of accidently (or structurally in the case of pollution associated to 
production) spreading toxic effluents in water, soil, air, etc. Hence, the costs of these disasters 
are difficult to predict. Economic theory considers either that these are given average data (as 
an expected value), or that this one varies according the activity or protection level2. 
However, each point of the deterministic value is calculated from an implicit given 
probability distribution. Therefore, this distribution can be questioned as it may seem 
plausible or not. Indeed, assessing the costs of damage after a catastrophe always cause 
problems. Hence, for Shavell in “Economic Analysis of Accident Law”, « Once it has been 
established that an injured is liable, the amount he is to pay the victim must be determined” 
Shavell (1987, p. 127). Shavell emphasizes the importance of losses evaluations by courts. In 
addition, the harm to individuals are always difficult to assess (Rogers, Bichaka and Balch 
(1991))) and the damage depends on the nature of the destroyed goods (Kopp and Smith 
(1993)). More precisely, if the reference to a market can help estimating private goods or 
property losses, this is hardly the case for semi-public and public goods. Therefore, giving an 
assessment of the value of damage before the accident is a hard task. Consequently, forming 
divergent estimates or beliefs about the damage scale is legitimate. Hedonic methods can be 
used, but the intensity of the sinister also affects the value of goods to be estimated (Maes 
(2010)). Furthermore, Shavell stresses that courts face with huge uncertainty when they have 
                                                          
2  See for instance Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi, (2003). 
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to determine the financial losses: « By contrast, because non pecuniary losses cannot be 
observed directly, they are difficult for courts to estimate. » (Shavell, (1987) op. cit. p. 
134). Consequently, if assessing ex-post damage is a complex task, the challenge is much 
higher when, ex-ante, the stakeholders must estimate it. Then, it is reasonable to consider that 
polluters and victims assess the costs of a major damage inside an interval and form beliefs 
once given the "official" data. In the present context, this forms the ambiguity theory basis.  
We develop here the beliefs about major damages. Let ℰ be the finite set of the states 
of nature that corresponds to a maximum damage involved by a major accident.  ℰ is included 
in the 𝜎𝜎-algebre of ℰ. We define a set of 𝐴𝐴 issues (value of damages) and a set of simple 
functions Φ that verify the following point-to point mapping: Φ = {𝑓𝑓: ℰ → 𝐴𝐴}. These ones 
map the damage set in 𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴 ⊂ ℝ, such that for each element  𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 ∈ 𝐴𝐴, (𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 is also called an act), 
we define the following ordering between the acts: 𝑎𝑎1 ≥ 𝑎𝑎2 … ≥ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛. Then, if 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) is the 
expected value of damage, now, the damage function writes as:  
(1)    𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) = ∫ 𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎)𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑  
(where 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑑𝑑 are defined below). 
And the neo-additive capacity is (see appendix 1 for details):  
(2) 𝜇𝜇( 𝐴𝐴 ∕  𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼) = � 0  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝐴𝐴 = ∅𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝜈𝜈0(𝐴𝐴) + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∅ ⊊ 𝐴𝐴 ⊊ ℰ1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴 = ℰ  
for 𝛼𝛼,𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]. 
Let 𝜈𝜈0(𝐴𝐴) = Inf(𝑓𝑓) = 𝑑𝑑  be the lowest damage cost and 𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) = Sup(𝑓𝑓) = 𝑙𝑙), the 
highest one. The values 𝛿𝛿 and 𝛼𝛼 represent the weight that the injurer allocates to the extreme 
events where 𝛿𝛿  is the preference for ambiguity while 𝛼𝛼 stands for the optimism degree3. Then 
for  ∅ ⊊ 𝐴𝐴 ⊊ ℰ  the neo-additive capacity is: 
(3)    𝜇𝜇( . ) = 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) 
We obtain a Choquet’s integral by integrating the capacity 𝜇𝜇( . ) that represents the 
expected costs related to a major accident:  
(4)  𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴/𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼) = 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) 
                                                          
3 See Teitelbaum(2007) for a more precise explanation about this point.  
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Hence, the Choquet integral of a neo-additive capacity consists of the following 
elements, i) The maximum value of the costs associated to a major accident( 𝑙𝑙), ii) Their 
minimum (𝑑𝑑),iii) Their expected value �𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎)�.  
Optimism and pessimism are associated with the accident scale. Optimism implies a 
high value of α, because it is associated to the lowest damage (𝑑𝑑) occurrence, while 
pessimism (1 − 𝛼𝛼) is linked to the highest damage cost 𝑙𝑙. Damage spans the entire 𝐴𝐴 
spectrum.  For instance, when 𝛼𝛼 = 0, the injurer is fully pessimistic, then: 
𝑉𝑉( 𝐴𝐴/𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿, 0) = 𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) 
Then, this expression only depends on his attitude to ambiguity 𝛿𝛿. When 𝛿𝛿 = 0, (full 
aversion for ambiguity) then the capacity comes to 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) and the probability distribution 
becomes: 𝜇𝜇(𝐴𝐴 ∕ 𝑝𝑝, 0,𝛼𝛼) = 𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴). Conversely, the higher 𝛿𝛿,  the lesser the tortfeasor will be 
confident in the expected value of the damage costs, 𝛿𝛿 = 1 means a complete distrust in it:  
(5)    𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴 ∕ 𝑝𝑝, 1,𝛼𝛼) = 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙 
This expression is also called the Hurwitz criterion, it is weighted by the injurer’s level 
of optimism and pessimism.  
Before beginning the study, let us have a look on the standard accident mode. Here, 
the omniscient, benevolent, neutral to risk regulator has to minimize the total accident costs: 
𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) or 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑙𝑙, (where 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) = 𝑙𝑙, in the following). Hence, 𝑥𝑥∗  the socially 
optimal level of care solves : min
𝑥𝑥>0
𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑙𝑙 
Then, assuming that 𝑥𝑥∗ is positive, this value is drawn from the first-order condition: 
−𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥)𝑙𝑙 = 1 
This last equation requires that the marginal reduction in expected accident losses 
equal the marginal cost. We can easily see that, under the standard case, the regulator do not 
care about the preferences of the polluters and victims. Furthermore, the level of care is 
independent from the liability regime 
 
2. The Model 
 
As Shavell (1985), we assume that all polluters are identical and this also the case for 
the victims. This assumption allows connecting generically a representative polluter and a 
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representative victim. The first ones sell to the second ones a product whose manufacturing 
process poses serious risks to human health, damage to property and to the environment. 
These risks affect the victims’ utility functions. In our model, the regulator maximizes a social 
utility function of Negishi (1960)’s type that builds by aggregating individual preferences. 
Aggregation is simplified because, as the agents are identical, their utility marginal value is 
identically weighted. The regulator’s role is then to induce the agents to reveal their 
preferences and to determine the socially first-best level of care by maximizing the aggregated 
social utility function.  
The government’s duty is to enforce the best civil liability regime, i.e. the one that 
must prompt the potential tortfeasors at applying the highest level of care at the lowest 
accident costs. To deal with this question, the basic model assumes that a dictatorial, 
omniscient, benevolent and neutral to risk regulator determines the socially optimal 
prevention level to which polluters must comply. When the regulator’s first-best prevention 
level corresponds to the one naturally chosen by the tortfeasor, the solution reaches the 
socially first best level of care. This involves that, both, polluter and regulator are risk neutral.  
However, when the troublemaker is averse to risk, his solution does not match with the 
regulator’s one and the equilibrium is no longer socially first-best (Shavell (1982)). 
 
Consequently, contrary to the standard model, the regulator is not a dictator. This 
difference has important implications. Here, the regulator aggregates the agents’ utilities to 
determine the social first-best. Other approaches than the Negishi’s one are also based on the 
aggregation of preferences to represent the social utility function. Harsanyi (1955) has 
inspired a revival in this direction (Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004), Fleurbaey and 
Mongin (2012), Danan, Gajdos and Tallon (2014)). Here, the aggregation is even easier than 
the agents in their own category (polluters and victims) are identical. 
The hypothesis of identical agents is not specific to our representation. If that were so, 
it would weaken the model. In fact, a similar assumption is found in Shavell (1982) and is 
common to the entire civil liability stream. Conversely, when the dictatorial regulator owns a 
specific utility function (Shavell (1982)) that does not represent the agents’ preference, the 
only position that allows reaching an efficient first-best level of care is when the injurer is 
also risk neutral. 
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3.1  Notations and assomptions 
- 𝑥𝑥  represents the level of care (or prevention), it is a cost corresponding to an effort. 
- 𝛹𝛹(𝑥𝑥) is the injurer’s Expected Choquet Utility (ECU) for an effort corresponding to  𝑥𝑥. 
- 𝑢𝑢 is the injurer’s wealth, 𝑢𝑢 > 0, 
- 𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥) is the victim’s ECU for a care effort corresponding to  𝑥𝑥. 
- 𝑣𝑣 is the victim’s wealth, 𝑣𝑣 > 0, 
-  𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is the probability of an accident for a care level 𝑥𝑥, with 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥) < 0 and 𝑝𝑝′′(𝑥𝑥) > 0. 
- 𝑑𝑑 cost of damage due to an accident caused by the polluter and 𝑙𝑙 is the level of repair that 
he can effectively make, with 𝑑𝑑 > 0, 𝑢𝑢 > 𝑙𝑙, 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑙𝑙. 
- 𝑑𝑑, 𝑙𝑙 notations that express the costs of a damage linked to an accident caused by the 
injurer, 𝑑𝑑, 𝑙𝑙 > 0, 𝑢𝑢 > 𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙 ≥ 𝑑𝑑. 
 
-  Liability regimes indexes: 
  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 : No-liability, 
 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 : Strict liability, 
 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 : Ceiled or capped strict liability, 
 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 : Negligence rule, 
 𝑠𝑠 = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆},  (each regime specificity will be stated when 
studying each situation). 
-  Construction of the expected Choquet utilities of polluters and victims:  
These relate to beliefs about the damage and the accident distributions. The following 
table allows synthesizing the agents’ beliefs. 
 
 Beliefs about the extent of major 
damage 
Belief on the probability of accidents 
distribution 
Degrees 
 
{Optimism, 
Pessimism} 
{Preference, 
ambiguity 
aversion } 
{Optimism, 
Pessimism} 
{ Preference, 
ambiguity 
aversion } 
Injurer {𝛼𝛼, 1 − 𝛼𝛼} {𝛾𝛾, 1 − 𝛾𝛾} {𝛽𝛽, 1 − 𝛽𝛽} {𝜃𝜃, 1 − 𝜃𝜃} 
Victim {𝜀𝜀, 1 − 𝜀𝜀} {𝜂𝜂, 1 − 𝜂𝜂} {𝜎𝜎, 1 − 𝜎𝜎} {𝜔𝜔, 1 − 𝜔𝜔} 
     
 
(where 𝜖𝜖, 𝜏𝜏 ∈ (0,1), 𝜖𝜖 = {𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝜀𝜀,𝜎𝜎 },𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝜏𝜏 = {𝛾𝛾,𝜃𝜃, 𝜂𝜂,𝜎𝜎})  
 The injurer : 
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Uncertainty that injurers face with is twofold. The first one concerns the damage 
scale. This interval is independent from the choice of the care level (as when damage is an 
expected value in the standard model). However, this assessment depends on the current 
liability regime. Indeed, according the current liability, the polluter may be either fully 
exempted or partially free from liability, or still fully involved. In a generic way, this situation 
is described by 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑠 = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆}, the ECU associated to the major damage. Then, 
from (3): 
(6) 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴/𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 (𝑎𝑎)
𝑐𝑐 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆   (𝑏𝑏)0 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑐𝑐)0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙  for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑑𝑑),  
Under strict liability (SL), the expectation of repairs for the polluter is (6)(𝑎𝑎), when 
the liability is capped (SLC), the amount is 6(𝑏𝑏). It is null for a full exemption of the injurers’ 
liability 6(𝑐𝑐) and, for negligence, the amount is either 0 or more as shows it 6(𝑑𝑑). 
The second source of uncertainty concerns the probability distribution of accident. 
From this point of view, the processing is entirely consistent with that of Teitelbaum (2007). 
Thus, considering that the value of the payoff function without accident is: Sup{ f} = (𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥), 
and 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓{ 𝑓𝑓} = (𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠  ) is the one reduced by repairs. 
(7) 𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛽𝛽 𝜃𝜃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝{ 𝑓𝑓} + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓{ 𝑓𝑓} + (1 − 𝜃𝜃){(1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥){𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓} +
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥){𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓})}, for, s = {NR, NLI, SL, SLC}. 
Replacing the maximum and minimum values, we get: 
(8)  𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛽𝛽 𝜃𝜃(𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃(𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠  ) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)��1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�(𝑢𝑢 −
𝑥𝑥) + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)(𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠)�= 𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥). 
After simplification, the injurer’s program consists in defining a care level that will 
minimize the accident probability and maintaining the lowest prevention cost: 
(9) 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1− 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) }  
As the wealth 𝑢𝑢 is given, this amounts to minimizing:  
(10)  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 −  𝜃𝜃) 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 + (1 −  𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠},  
for  s = {NR, NLI, SL, SLC} 
 The victim(s) 
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As the regulator aggregates the agents’ preferences, it makes sense to include the 
victims’ perception of damage. Indeed, these estimates influence the first-best level of care 
and the current liability regime influences the level of repairs by the compensation that the 
victims receive. Thus, the victims’ ECU becomes: 
(11)  𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 = 𝑉𝑉𝜙𝜙 = 𝜀𝜀𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑙𝑙, for s = {NR, NLI, SL, SLC}. 
𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴/𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
0 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁  (𝑎𝑎)
𝜀𝜀𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑙𝑙 − 𝑐𝑐 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 (𝑏𝑏)
𝜀𝜀𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑙𝑙 for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑐𝑐)0 or 𝜀𝜀𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑙𝑙  for 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑) 
The (11) (a), (b), (c), (d) cases correspond to the above (6) cases and a further 
explanation is not necessary. 
This one is integrated in their ECU : 
(12) 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) =  {𝜎𝜎 𝜔𝜔 𝑣𝑣 + (1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝜔𝜔(𝑣𝑣 − 𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠) + (1 − 𝜔𝜔){𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)(𝑣𝑣 − 𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠) + (1 −
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥))(𝑣𝑣)} } = = 𝑣𝑣 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥), for 𝑠𝑠 = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆} 
 The regulator 
The regulator does not impose his preferences on the basis of a priori given utility 
function. This means that he determines the socially first-best level of care after the 
aggregation of the agent’s utility functions. As by assumption, all producers are identical as 
are identical the victims, the regulator simply aggregates the utilities of representative agents. 
Let 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥)  be the social utility function, then, the regulator’s program is to maximize this 
function: 
(13) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) } for 𝑠𝑠 = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆} 
For now, we cannot further specify the social utility function because this one 
depends on the current civil liability regime.  
3.2  The first-best solutions to the unilateral accident question  
 "Solutions" in the plural means that accident costs are not independent from the 
liability regime, unlike the standard model. It is the point that we study by now. As the 
regulator is benevolent, he determines the Pareto-efficient care efforts.  
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Considering that 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 and 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 correspond respectively to the wealth of injurer and 
victims without accident occurrence and 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛  and 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 to their wealth after an accident, the 
regulator’s program becomes: max
𝑥𝑥,𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎,𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛,[(𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)(1− 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)))𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎) + ((1− 𝜎𝜎)𝜔𝜔 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)(𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)))𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛)] (14 
a)  
Under the constraints : 
- �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)��𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) + �(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)��𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛) = 𝑈𝑈       (14 b) 
- �𝜎𝜎𝜔𝜔 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�� 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 + �(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝜔𝜔 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�� 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 + �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�1 −
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�� 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 + 
�(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�� 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 + 𝑥𝑥 + [(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + (1 −
𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠]𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣    (14 c) 
for 𝑠𝑠 = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆}. (14 c) builds from the decomposition of 𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) . This means that the 
resources used for potential repairs are equal to the present, available resources. We use the 
Khun-Tucker method to solve this system. Then, for a given 𝑥𝑥 and differentiating the program 
to 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 and 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛, and 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎, 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛, it appears that 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎) = 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛) (by eliminating multiplicators) for 
𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎 = 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 = 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 = ℎ, this condition is sufficient and necessary to satistfy (b) and 
(c). Replacing theses values in the program by 𝜇𝜇 and ℎ, this one becomes: 
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥,,,𝜇𝜇,ℎ[𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠(𝜇𝜇)]       (15 a’) 
Under the constraints: 
 𝛹𝛹𝑠𝑠(ℎ) = 𝑈𝑈      (15 b’) 
 𝜇𝜇 + ℎ + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 + 𝑥𝑥 + [(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠]𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣  (15 c’) 
By (b’),  ℎ  is determined and it is substituted in (c’). Then:  
(16) 𝜇𝜇 = 𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣 − ℎ − �(1 −𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠� − �𝑥𝑥 + [(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + (1 −
𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠]𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�  
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As the components of  𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣 − ℎ − �(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠� are given, the program 
amounts at minimizing �𝑥𝑥 + [(1 −𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠]𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�. This one is contingent to the 
liability regime that the regulator has enforced. Indeed, in the bracket expression, we cannot 
sum indistinctly 𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠  et 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 . Indeed, this would involve repairing twice as one can verify it by 
developing the expression : [(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠] = 𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 + 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 𝜔𝜔𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 − 𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 .  
We will now study this point by examining the optimality conditions of the different 
liability regimes. 
3.3 The injurer’s irresponsibility 
In this scenario, polluters are not liable for their damage. Therefore, the Society as a 
whole supports the burden of repairs. This irresponsibility, however, does not prevent the 
regulator to determine the socially first best level of care. In this aim, we define the different 
steps corresponding to the government’s calculation. Hence, the injurers’ cost function 
becomes: 
(17) 𝛹𝛹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 
The latter are not induced to invest in prevention because, obviously, they are free 
from any liability in case of an accident and the care level will be null. For the victims, before 
the accident, the costs of a potential accident depend on their beliefs about it scale:   
(18) 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑣𝑣 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) 
Hence, the aggregated social utility function is: 
(19) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛹𝛹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 −(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) 
And, the socially first-best level of care 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 0 is this value for which 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
= 0 
   
(20)  
𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = − 1(1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝛩𝛩𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = − 1(1 − 𝜔𝜔)�𝜀𝜀𝜂𝜂𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝜂𝜂)𝑙𝑙� 
Then, the government will have setting up specific regulatory instruments if he wants 
that  𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 be reached. Note that if the victim feels no preference for ambiguity (η = 0,ω =0), then there are the traditional results obtained under the assumption of neutrality to risk: 
(21)  
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𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)|𝜂𝜂=0,𝜔𝜔=0 = − 1
𝑙𝑙
 
Where 𝑙𝑙 is the expected level of damage.  
3.4 Strict liability with capped repairs  
We present this scheme for heuristic reasons because, here, both victims and 
polluters bear the burden of reparations. This type of liability governs the nuclear sector and 
the maritime transportation of oil. Facing the damage hugeness related to the industry activity 
(risk of radioactivity extended to people and the environment for nuclear or oil spills for the 
oil sector), the States, on the basis of international conventions, have established liability rules 
intended to encourage private investment. Strict liability blames the operator of a hazardous 
activity without need of demonstrating the existence of misconduct, but this liability is limited 
by a ceiling of the repair. Hence, concerning injurers, the damage scale is limited till a given 
ceiling 𝑐𝑐 (cap) 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑙𝑙 less than the maximum level of damage. The difference 𝑙𝑙 − 𝑐𝑐 is charged 
to victims. Hence, their respective payoff functions write as: 
a. Injurers 
Limiting the amount of the damage affects the victim’s Choquet integral: 
(22) 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 =  𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙 where 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑙𝑙  
Then, the program becomes : 
(23) 𝛹𝛹𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) or still : 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) }  
b. Victims 
Compared to the previous situation where the polluters were liability free, the repairs 
borne by victims decrease : 
(24) Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜂𝜂(𝑙𝑙 − 𝑐𝑐)  
And, after having introduced this expression in the CEU : 
(25) 𝜙𝜙𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑣𝑣 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)𝜎𝜎Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − (1 − 𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) 
c. The Regulator 
As previously, by summing (23) and (25), we get the social utility function: 
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(26) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛹𝛹𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜙𝜙𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − 𝜔𝜔𝜎𝜎Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 −
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�(1− 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆� 
According to this scenario, the regulator requires a level of protection equal to 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆, 
where 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 is this value for which 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = 0, and, 
(27) 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆+(1−𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 
The injurer maximizes his payoff for, 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆  where 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 < 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 (This point is proved 
in appendix 2), hence, his program is: 
(28) 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) } 
We cans see that this program amounts to minimizing {𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)}. 
 It follows that the regulator has to find the economic tools that induce the tortfeasor 
to achieve the prevention level 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 and no 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 . Here, enforcing negligence is not possible 
since ceiling the repairs is intended to encourage the producers to invest when the expected 
level of repairs is too high and may deter the investment in risky activities.  
3.5 Strict liability vs negligence rule 
Here we compare the objective and subjective responsibility regimes. This section 
shows that uncertainty is not a sufficient condition for proving the absence of Pareto-
optimality. 
1) Strict liability 
In a strict liability regime, the party who causes the damage is held responsible even 
without proof of misconduct. The existence of damage and the proximity of the activity or 
still the activity itself are sufficient to deduce the tortfeasor’s liability. To investigate this 
case, as before, we introduce the polluter’s payoff function, the victims’ one and we deduce 
the social utility function..  
a. The injurer 
Unlike previous cases, polluters are totally responsible when an accident associated 
with their activity occurs. Thus, the Choquet integral of the damage is written as: 
(29) 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 =  𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙 
And the payoff function is the following Choquet integral of neo-additive capacity: 
(30) 𝛹𝛹𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) 
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b. The Victims 
Under strict liability, the victims are fully compensated for their losses due to the 
polluters. Hence, the victims’ damage function will be:  Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 = 0 and their payoff corresponds 
to their initial wealth: 
(31) 𝜙𝜙𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑣𝑣 
The victim’s payoff function is not affected by the consequences of an accident, 
when the injurer’s wealth is large enough: 𝑢𝑢 > 𝑙𝑙. 
c. The regulator  
As previously, the social utility function is deduced from the aggregation of the 
agents’ utility. Then, the regulator maximizes the following function: 
(32) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛹𝛹𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜙𝜙𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 + 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�(1− 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁� 
We can see that this comes to minimize: 
(32’)  𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�(1− 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁� 
Here, the regulator requires a level of care equivalent to 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁, where 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 is this 
value for which 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁) = 0, or still: 
(33) 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁 
𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 is the care effort which is socially optimal and desired by the regulator. For its 
part, the injurer maximizes his payoff for, 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 where 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 = 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁. This result deduces from his 
program Max
𝑥𝑥≥0
{𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) } in which, by the same argument than 
above, it appears that the injurer must minimize the following accident costs: 
 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)�(1− 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁�.  
Hence, the regulator and the injurer minimize the same function. We deduce the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1 : Under Knightian uncertainty and under strict liability, then a social optimum 
will be achieved with injurers wealth higher than damage (𝑢𝑢 > 𝑙𝑙): the victims will be fully 
reimbursed for their losses and the level of prevention effort will be a first best level. 
Proof: The proof follows from the above argument. 
Remark 1: This result is similar to the one reached with the basic unilateral accident 
model when, both, regulator and injurer are risk neutral (see Shavell 1987 (b)). Here, the 
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agents’ ambiguity aversion (polluters and victims) is not a hurdle to the implementation of the 
first-best. This is because the regulator is not dictatorial considering the agents’ preferences 
that he aggregates  
2) The negligence rule 
Under negligence, the formal results are not different from the ones got under strict 
liability. The payoff functions of both categories of agent (injurers and victims) are similar to 
the case of strict liability as shows it the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Under Knightian uncertainty and negligence rule, then the standard of due 
care equals the first best-level.  
Proof : The proof is similar to Shavell (1984). Hence, to avoid the loss of a part of 
his wealth in case of an accident, the injurer supplies a care level higher or equal to the first-
best:  
(34) 𝛹𝛹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃Θ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) if  𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  
And, 
(34’)  𝛹𝛹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑢𝑢 − 𝑥𝑥, if 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.  
The tortfeasor cannot invest less than 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, but, also, he cannot supply a higher 
effort. Consequently, the socially first best level is 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. For determining 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, it is sufficient 
to verify that : 
 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 =  𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑙𝑙 
Consequently: 
(35) 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)𝛩𝛩𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. And, naturally : 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 = 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, because, here (11) 
(d). 
From this result, and from proposition 1 and 2, the following proposition 3 deduces: 
Proposition 3: Under Knightian uncertainty, whatever the current liability regime, then the 
first-best effort will be the same: 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁 = 𝑥𝑥∗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Remark 2:  Propositions 1 to 3 contradict the recent literature for which radical 
uncertainty causes inefficiency. When the agents’ wealth covers the damage costs, whatever 
the liability regime (strict liability or negligence), the required socially first-best care is 
identical. As the polluter implements the optimal care effort, then the regulator will not have 
to define incentives to reach this goal. Inefficiency means the difference between the first rank 
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security level determined by the regulator and the injurer’s optimum level of safety. Thus, in 
this context, inefficiency does not come from uncertainty, but from the tortfeasor’s inability of 
fulfilling his repair’s commitment. Several factors explain this situation. The first one is the 
definition of legal ceiling for repairs. Another possibility comes from the situation where the 
injurer becomes “judgment-proof" as described by Shavell (1986), Summers (1983). This 
state can be deliberately organized by the polluter (Van’t Veld and ali ((1997), van 2006). In 
all cases, the ineffectiveness of the equilibrium solution is verified. In our representation this 
situation is illustrated in Section 3.4 when repairs are bounded by an institutional ceiling. 
Shavell (1982) shows that when the polluter feels risk aversion, then, faced with a neutral 
regulator vis-à-vis risk, the solution is not effective. He highlights, that the necessary 
prevention level will be more important (Shavell (1982)) that involves more wealth dedicated 
to repairs.  
Remark 3: In the standard unilateral accident model, the court is poorly defined and 
remains in the background. In fact, with a dictatorial, neutral to risk regulator, the court 
(assuming it does not make mistakes) has to follow the regulator’s position. Otherwise, this 
involves that the judge owns a specific utility function (e.g. showing a risk aversion) that 
differs from the regulator one. Under negligence, there would be a potential divergence level 
between the court and the regulator concerning the assessment of the socially optimal care 
level. Hence, the polluter could legitimately feel perplexity wondering about the effective 
level of care to implement. This would lead to indeterminacy for the regimes based on 
negligence: should he follow the regulator or should he forecast the judge’s one? To ask the 
question is to answer it: under dictatorial governance, the court cannot diverge from the 
regulator choice. Then, court is reduced to a mere verification body. Under radical uncertainty 
and a no-dictatorial regulator, the court may have an independent existence despite the 
similarities with the standard case. Indeed, the court may accept not having a dissent 
concerning the first-best care level: it legitimately may accept the regulator’s predominance 
since the social utility function reflects the agents’ preferences. If by chance the court had a 
different opinion, this would mean that it substitutes its own logic to the regulator’s one and 
its decisions can be considered as arbitrary. However, the court could dispose of new 
information that has not been previously transmitted by one of the parties to the regulator. 
This last possibility deserves discussion, but that will take us too far. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
Simple in its basic formulation, the unilateral accident model is far from having 
revealed all its potential. The question of the regulator’s utility function is central. When the 
regulator is dictatorial, reaching the first-best level of care involves that his preferences are 
consistent with the injurer ones (both neutral to risk). With agents that feel aversion to risk 
or/and ambiguity the solutions are not optimal. This is the current result on which issued the 
literature of radical uncertainty since Teitelbaum (2007). In our opinion, this result comes 
from the specific assumption that the contemporaneous literature made on the regulator.   
Indeed, things become different when the regulator aggregates the agents’ utility 
functions and this is the point the model focused on. It extends uncertainty to victims and 
spreads on two structural levels: the distribution of accident probabilities on the one hand and 
the scale of major damage on the other one. With a non-dictatorial benevolent regulator, 
uncertainty does not induce the inefficacy of the equilibrium solution. Furthermore, the 
liability regimes, strict liability and negligence, can be considered as equivalent as in the 
standard unilateral accident model without ambiguity. In fact, inefficiency of the social care 
level comes from the level of the polluters’ wealth. Indeed, when this wealth is insufficient to 
cover the damage costs, it causes a difference between the social first-best of care and the 
private one. This discrepancy between wealth and damage (damage costs higher than injurer’s 
wealth) is the main cause of the social inadequacy of the prevention level rather than radical 
uncertainty. This is what literature called as the "judgment-proof" question.  May one direct 
future research will be to assess which liability regime fits better under the injurer’s 
judgment-proof situation.  
Starting from this basis, many questions remain to examine as, for instance, the errors 
made by the Courts, or more precisely the differences between the regulator’s assessment and 
the Courts’ estimations. This issue is particularly sensitive for the comparison between strict 
liability and negligence. Another less legalist question deals with issues relating to the risk 
assessment the government over the potential injurers’ estimates.  
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Appendix 1 
The concept of neo-additive capacity. 
 
More generally, the criticism of the expected utility foundations began in the midst of 
last century when, first, Allais (1953) criticized the Savage’s independence axiom. 
Furthermore, Ellsberg in 1961 showed that the Savage’s preference preorder leads to the 
paradoxical situation in which the sum of probability on uncertain events differs from one4. 
To explain this, let us see a schematic example. Hence, consider a player and two urns that 
contain, each, blue and red balls. The player wins x dollars when he draws a blue ball from 
one urn. In one of these, he knows the probability of drawing a red or a blue ball, while in the 
other urn this proportion is unspecified. Before the ball draw, the player must choose the urn 
in which he will draw the ball. Consequently, if he chooses the urn in which the proportion of 
blue and red balls is known, he implicitly considers that, with this urn, the odds of winning 
are greater than with the other one. Thus, he marks an aversion to ambiguity. Hence, if the 
odds of winning are 45% with the urn in which probabilities are given, he considers that the 
probability of winning is less than 45% if choosing the other one. By doing so, it appears that 
the sum of the probabilities for a given event is greater than 1. 
Schmeidler (1989) systematizes Ellsberg’s approach by using Choquet’s integrals as 
substitute to the Savage Expected Utility theory (SEU). For modern ambiguity theory, a non-
additive probability or "capacity" represents the agents’ beliefs about the likelihood of events. 
The agents maximize a utility function based, not on the sum of weighted utility indices, with 
weights that sum to 1 as in the theory of Savage, but for a sum greater than 1 which represents 
a Choquet integral. It is admitted that according the integral shape (concave or convex) the 
agent expresses optimism (concavity due to super-addivitivity) or pessimism (sub- 
additivity)5. Schmeidler’s approach hardly lends itself to manageable extensions. However, 
Chateauneuf, Eichenberger and Grant (2007) (CEG) performed this task by developing the 
concept of neo-additive capacity. Due to its characteristics, this concept allows integrating the 
                                                          
4 See Teitelbaum (2007) for a complete review. 
5 Voir Teitelbaum(2007). 
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contributions of experimental economics in the decision field6. Indeed, this capacity is 
additive on non-extreme values but non-additive on maximum and minimum values. This 
means that, for example, in bets situations, the “real” persons do not behave as predicted by 
the expected utility theory. Indeed, they tend to overestimate the probability of higher 
earnings while generally these one are close to 0 (the case of national lotteries) and tend to 
underestimate the probabilities of losses for low earnings (see Camerer and Weber (1992) 
Gonzales and Wu (1999) or Abdellaoui (2000)).These results are illustrated by the well-
known inverted S-shaped curve. Appendix 1 of this article briefly presents the mathematical 
foundations of this approach. 
We do not propose here a full formal mathematical presentation. The interested lector may 
refer to the clear exposition of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007) (CEG(2007) in the 
following).  
A capacity is an extension of a probability. It is a function 𝜏𝜏(𝑝𝑝) that assigns real numbers to 
events ℰ, where ℰ is the set built from the set 𝕊𝕊 of the states of nature. A capacity fulfills two 
conditions. First, for all 𝐸𝐸,𝐹𝐹 ∈ ℰ, and 𝐸𝐸 ⊆ 𝐹𝐹, then 𝜏𝜏(𝐸𝐸)  ⊆ 𝜏𝜏(𝐹𝐹) as monotonicity condition 
and, second, as normalization conditions, 𝜏𝜏(∅) = 0 and 𝜏𝜏(𝕊𝕊) = 1. 
The best way to integrate capacities is the Choquet integral. To do that, it is assumed that 
exists a simple function of finite range 𝑓𝑓 that takes values 𝜇𝜇1 ≥ 𝜇𝜇2 … ≥ 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛. A Choquet 
integral of a simple function 𝑓𝑓 with respect to a capacity щ(. ) is defined as: 
𝑉𝑉(𝑓𝑓/𝜏𝜏) =  ∑ 𝜇𝜇[𝜏𝜏({𝑠𝑠/𝑓𝑓 ≥ 𝜇𝜇}) − 𝜏𝜏({𝑠𝑠/𝑓𝑓 > 𝜇𝜇})]𝜇𝜇∈𝑓𝑓(𝕊𝕊)    (1A) 
Through the concept of neo-additive capacity the Choquet integral overweight high outcomes 
if the capacity is concave or overweigh low income if the capacity is convex. Convexity of a 
capacity is verified by the following relationships: 
 𝜏𝜏(𝐸𝐸 ∪ 𝐹𝐹) ≥ 𝜏𝜏(𝐸𝐸) + 𝜏𝜏(𝐹𝐹) − 𝜏𝜏(𝐸𝐸 ∩ 𝐹𝐹) (and concave in the opposite situation).  
Applying this to our model, we consider that the polluter and the society cannot assess with 
certainty the exact value of a maximum damage. Let be ℰ the finite set of states to which 
correspond the catastrophic events 𝒜𝒜 (𝜎𝜎-algebra of ℰ). We consider a finite set of outcomes ( 
𝐴𝐴 ⊂ ℝ) and let Φ = {𝑓𝑓: ℰ → 𝐴𝐴} be a set of simple functions from states to outcomes which 
correspond to simple acts and takes on values 𝑎𝑎1 ≥ 𝑎𝑎2 … ≥ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛. 
The polluter is gifted with a Choquet objective function which corresponds here to an 
expected cost function. His beliefs on the level of damage correspond to a neo-additive 
capacity (𝜇𝜇) based on (𝑝𝑝). Hence, the operator will form beliefs about the level of the 
damage. This is a supplementary uncertainty. We can define now the neo-additive capacity. 
To do that let us consider that the 𝜎𝜎-algebra 𝒜𝒜 is partitioned in three subsets that we present 
and characterize (for a more complete information see CFG (2002, 3). 
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- The set of null events 𝒩𝒩,  where ∅ ∈ 𝒩𝒩 and for 𝐺𝐺 ⊂ 𝐻𝐻, and 𝐺𝐺 ∈ 𝒩𝒩 if 𝐻𝐻 ∈ 𝒩𝒩. 
- The set of “universal events” 𝒲𝒲, in which an event is certain to occur, 
(complement of each member of the set 𝒩𝒩). 
- The set of essential events, 𝒜𝒜∗, in which events are neither impossible nor certain. 
This set is composed of the following: 
𝒜𝒜∗ = 𝒜𝒜 − ( 𝒩𝒩 ∪𝒲𝒲) 
Before going further, we define the following capacities 𝜈𝜈 (see appendix): 
𝜈𝜈0(𝐴𝐴) = 1 if 𝐴𝐴 ∈ 𝒲𝒲 and 0 otherwise and 𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) = 0 for 𝐴𝐴 ∈ 𝒩𝒩 and 𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) = 1 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, we define a finite additive probability 𝑝𝑝(. ) such that 𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) = 0, if 𝐴𝐴 ∈ 𝒩𝒩 and 1 
otherwise. 
Definition 1: Let 𝜆𝜆, 𝛾𝛾 that belong to a simplex ∆ in ℝ2, (∆≔ {(𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) ∕   𝛼𝛼 ≥0,𝛽𝛽 ≥ 0,𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1 }), a neo-additive capacity 𝜇𝜇 based on the distribution of 
probability 𝑝𝑝(. ) is defined as: 
𝜇𝜇( 𝐴𝐴 ∕  𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆, 𝛾𝛾) = � 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴 = ∅𝜆𝜆𝜈𝜈0(𝐴𝐴) + 𝛾𝛾𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∅ ⊊ 𝐴𝐴 ⊊ ℰ1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴 = ℰ (2A) 
A neo-additive capacity is additive on non-extreme outcomes. Here 𝑝𝑝 corresponds to the 
probability of a major accident of a given scale. This is a common belief and (1 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜆𝜆) 
represents the degree of confidence of the agent in this belief. We will give below, after the 
presentation of the Choquet integral of the neo-additive capacity, more complete explanation 
on the concept of optimism.  
Then, we can define the Choquet integral which is a weighted sum of the minimum, the 
maximum and the expectation of a simple function 𝑓𝑓: ℰ → ℝ as it is expressed in the 
following relationship: 
𝑉𝑉( 𝑓𝑓 ∕ 𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆, 𝛾𝛾) = 𝜆𝜆. inf(𝑓𝑓) + 𝛾𝛾 . sup(𝑓𝑓) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜆𝜆)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓)  (3A) 
Where 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓) is the expected value of the expected costs of a major accident, and from the 
linearity of the Choquet integral with respect to the capacity, we define 𝑉𝑉� 𝑓𝑓 ∕  𝜈𝜈0(. )� =inf(𝑓𝑓) and 𝑉𝑉� 𝑓𝑓 ∕  𝜈𝜈1(. )� = sup(𝑓𝑓), (proof see CFG(2002, 3) and CFG(2006, 3).  
Then for 𝑒𝑒 ∈ ℰ, 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒) = 𝑎𝑎, we put, 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒1) = sup(𝑓𝑓) = 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛) = inf(𝑓𝑓) = 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝑑𝑑 . 
As, 𝑝𝑝(. ) is a finitely additive probability distribution on 𝒜𝒜, we define 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓) as: 
𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑓𝑓) = 𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎) = ∫ 𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎)𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑     (4A) 
Taking into account these factors, the Choquet integral writes now: 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝 = 𝜆𝜆. 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜆𝜆)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎)    (5A) 
Hence, if 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜆𝜆 = 0, we find the usual expected utility. With 1 ≥ 𝛾𝛾 > 0, 𝜆𝜆 = 0, the subject is 
waiving between the lowest value and the expected value of the function. That corresponds to 
pessimism because the operator cannot consider that 𝑙𝑙 occurs with sufficiently high 
probability. Then, optimism is induced by 𝛾𝛾 = 0, 1 ≥ 𝜆𝜆 > 0.  
In order keeping a correspondence with the Teitelbaum (2007)’s analysis, we make the 
following change of variable that corresponds to the treatment of CEG (2007) in their paper : 
25 
 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾 = 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼), then we can check that 1 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜆𝜆 = 1 − 𝛿𝛿 with 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) 
The neo-additive capacity is then:  
𝜇𝜇( 𝐴𝐴 ∕  𝑝𝑝, 𝛿𝛿,𝛼𝛼) = � 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴 = ∅𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝜈𝜈0(𝐴𝐴) + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝜈𝜈1(𝐴𝐴) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∅ ⊊ 𝐴𝐴 ⊊ ℰ1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴 = ℰ  (6A) 
Or, still, for  ∅ ⊊ 𝐴𝐴 ⊊ ℰ 
𝜇𝜇( . ) = 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)    (7A) 
we get then the neo-capacity’s Choquet Integral: 
𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝 = 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎)    (8A) 
The precise meaning of the weight 𝛿𝛿 (aversion for ambiguity) and 𝛼𝛼 (degree of optimism) is 
made in the paper. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Proof that :  𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 < 𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆.  
This proof is classical. Let us check that 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 verifies  𝛹𝛹′𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆(𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = 0, 
and 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 .  
For (1 − 𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0, (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 ≥ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆, and, 
 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆+(1−𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 < 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 , for 𝜃𝜃 ≠ 0  
Consequently :  
𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆+(1−𝜔𝜔)Θ𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 >  𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) = − 1(1−𝜃𝜃)Θ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 , 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥) < 0 
However, as 𝑝𝑝′′(𝑥𝑥) > 0, , 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥) is an increasing function, 𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) >  𝑝𝑝′(𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆) 
involves that  𝑥𝑥∗𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 > 𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆 . 
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